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ABSTRACT 
 
In 1973, the United States Supreme Court in United 
States v. Robinson granted police broad authority to 
search arrestees’ personal property. Robinson’s broad rule 
has not been significantly limited and appears increasingly 
anachronistic in an age of rapidly advancing mobile 
technologies. Whether upholding or invalidating such 
searches, courts have relied on reasoning that ignores or 
conflicts with Robinson. This Article illustrates four 
problematic contrivances used by state and federal courts: 
(1) the comparison of mobile devices to “containers; (2) 
the misinterpretation of United States v. Chadwick’s 
concept of “property not immediately associated with the 
person;” (3) the unjustifiable application of Arizona v. 
Gant’s “reason to believe” rationale; and (4) the baseless 
categorical exclusion of cell phones from the search 
incident doctrine. In light of the public’s apparently high 
expectation of privacy for information stored on mobile 
devices, this Article recommends two possible solutions for 
restricting police authority: (1) return to an exigency-based 
rationale following Chimel v. California or (2) look to state 
legislatures to curb police powers through law making. 
* Derek Scheurer graduated Case Western Reserve University School of 
Law in May 2013 and has since been living in the Northwest and working as a 
legal fellow for the Northwest Justice Project. He thanks his family, friends, 
professors, and cat for their support during the writing of this Article. 
                                                                                                             
1
Scheurer: Are Courts Phoning It in? Resolving Problematic Reasoning in the
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2014
288 WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS  [VOL. 9:4 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Introduction ..................................................................................288 
I. Background ...........................................................................290 
A. The Fourth Amendment and the Search-Incident-to- 
Arrest Exception ............................................................290 
B. Searches of Digital Devices Incident to Arrest ................297 
1. Lower Courts Permitting Searches of Cell Phones 297 
2. Cases Restricting Searches of Cell Phones Incident  
to Arrest ..................................................................299 
3. United States v. Robinson’s Relevance to  
Cell Phones .............................................................303 
II. Resolving Courts’ Problematic Reasoning in the Debate  
over Cell Phone Searches Incident to Arrest ........................306 
A. The Irrelevance of Categorizing Cell Phones  as “Closed 
Containers” ....................................................................307 
B. Misapplication of United States v. Chadwick ..................309 
C. The Arbitrariness of the Arizona v. Gant Standard .........313 
1. Doctrinal Ambivalence in Arizona v. Gant ............313 
2. The Problem of Analogizing Gant .........................316 
D. State v. Smith, Smallwood v. State, and the Insufficiency of 
a High Expectation of Privacy  to Preclude a Search 
Incident to Arrest ...........................................................317 
1. State v. Smith ..........................................................317 
2. Smallwood v. State .................................................321 
3. Smallwood and Smith: Common Problems ............323 
III. Reconnecting with Chimel: Two Approaches Forward ........324 
A. Judicial Solution: Limit Robinson’s Scope .....................325 
B. Legislative Solution: Bypass Judicial Indecision.............327 
Conclusion ...................................................................................329 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The technological innovations of the digital age have certainly 
added “grist to the mill”1 of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. In 
1 Wayne R. LaFave, “Case-By-Case Adjudication” Versus “Standardized 
Procedures”: The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 127 (1974) (“[T]he 
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particular, the proliferation and advancement of digital media and 
portable storage devices allow individuals to carry virtual 
warehouses of highly personal information. In all but one state,2 
arrests for an infraction as slight as a traffic violation may allow 
arresting officers to conduct unrestricted, warrantless searches of 
electronic devices under the Fourth Amendment’s search-incident-
to-arrest exception. The United States Supreme Court has not yet 
spoken directly about the constitutionality of warrantless cell 
phone searches incident to arrest. However, state and federal courts 
interpret past Supreme Court rulings to allow police almost 
unrestricted authority.  
Most scholars, and a few courts, have recoiled from such broad 
authority to search and have crafted arguments that appear to 
rescue cell phones from the search-incident-to-arrest exception. 
Closer inspection of several major arguments reveals flaws in their 
reasoning that ultimately render these positions unworkable. A 
common theme among these arguments is the failure to confront 
the Supreme Court’s language in United States v. Robinson, which 
explicitly grants police broad authority to search all property found 
on an arrestee’s person.3 This Article suggests that restoring the 
original policy interests of Chimel v. California4 offers the only 
persuasive means of confronting the broad search authority of 
Robinson. The law must return to the exigency-based roots of the 
search-incident-to-arrest exception: officer safety and evidence 
preservation. 
Part I briefly surveys the search-incident-to-arrest exception to 
the warrant requirement, including its roots in the Fourth 
Amendment, its later development and expansion, and the courts’ 
recent application of the doctrine to cell phones. Part II introduces 
and rebuts four common arguments used by courts to limit the 
general authority of police to search mobile phone contents 
incident to lawful arrest. These are (1) the irrelevant comparison of 
cell phones to physical “containers;” (2) the misinterpretation of 
confirmed Fourth Amendment buff is never in want of grist for his mill.”). 
2 At the time of writing, Ohio is the only state prohibiting cell phone 
searches incident to arrest. See State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949 (Ohio 2009). 
3 414 U.S. 218 (1973). 
4 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
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United States v. Chadwick’s concept of property “not immediately 
associated with the person”5 as a categorical exception to the 
search-incident-to-arrest exception; (3) the inability to justify the 
application of Arizona v. Gant’s evidence-based “reason to 
believe” rationale to cell phone searches;6 and (4) the baseless 
categorical exclusion of cell phones from the search-incident-to-
arrest doctrine, pioneered by the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. 
Smith.7  
In light of the public’s apparently high expectation of privacy 
for information accessible through cell phones, Part III advocates 
two possible approaches for restricting police access during 
searches incident. First, a potential judicial rule may return courts’ 
focus to the exigency-based rationale first articulated in Chimel.8 
Second, state legislatures offer a more likely avenue for reform. A 
legislative solution can directly address the public’s privacy 
concerns, avoid the jurisprudential morass of the Fourth 
Amendment, and remain adaptable to future evolution of portable 
technologies. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
A.  The Fourth Amendment and the  
Search-Incident-to-Arrest Exception 
 
The Fourth Amendment forbids the government from 
conducting “unreasonable searches and seizures.”9 An 
unreasonable search occurs when governmental action violates an 
individual’s “reasonable” or “legitimate” expectation of privacy. 
Such a violation exists when “a person [has] exhibited an actual 
(subjective) expectation of privacy and . . . society is prepared to 
recognize [that expectation] as ‘reasonable.’” 10 Warrantless 
5 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977). 
6 556 U.S. 332 (2009). 
7 920 N.E.2d 949 (Ohio 2009). 
8 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
9  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
10  Katz. v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., 
concurring). 
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infringements on legitimate privacy interests are normally deemed 
per se unreasonable.11 If the warrant requirement serves as a gate 
that separates law enforcement from citizens’ private lives, then 
magistrates play the gatekeeper. Magistrates only issue search 
warrants if the government has shown a great enough need to 
justifiably infringe on an individual’s particular privacy interests.12 
At the same time, however, the United States Supreme Court 
recognizes “a few specifically established and well-delineated 
exceptions” that allow the government to sidestep the normal 
warrant requirement.13 
One such exception is for searches incident to lawful arrest. 
Current criminal procedure treats the warrantless search of an 
arrestee’s person as a definite right of the police. However, 
historical records dating back to the 18th century illustrate searches 
far more limited in scope.14 From the late 19th century and into the 
20th century, searches incident to arrest were permitted out of the 
police’s need to disarm potentially violent suspects. Police were 
also allowed to search arrestees to secure evidence material to the 
particular crime of arrest.15  
11  Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973). 
12  Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 761 (1969) (“[Magistrates issue 
warrants] so that an objective mind might weigh the need to invade that privacy 
in order to enforce the law. The right of privacy was deemed too precious to 
entrust to the discretion of those whose job is the detection of crime and the 
arrest of criminals.”) (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 
(1948)). 
13 Katz, 389 U.S. at 357. 
14  Wayne A. Logan, An Exception Swallows a Rule: Police Authority to 
Search Incident to Arrest, 19 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 381, 385 (2001). 
15  United States v. Wilson, 163 F. 338, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1908) (“[T]he 
property must be material, or seem to be material, as evidence on the charge 
which is made against the defendant.”); Thatcher v. Weeks, 11 A. 599 (Me. 
1887) (finding officers entitled to seize items “that may be of use as evidence 
upon the trial”); Holker v. Hennesey, 42 S.W. 1090, 1093 (Mo. 1897) (“[A]n 
officer has no right to take any property from the person of the prisoner, except 
such as may afford evidence of the crime charged . . . .”); Dillon v. O'Brien, 16 
Cox Crim. Cas. 245, 249 (Exchequer Div. 1887) (“[C]onstables . . . are entitled, 
upon a lawful arrest by one of them charged with treason or felony to take and 
detain property found in his possession, which will form material evidence in his 
prosecution for that crime.”); see Joseph H. Beale, Jr., CRIMINAL PLEADING AND 
PRACTICE § 29, 24-25 (1889) (“Any article found upon the prisoner which is 
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In 1914, the United States Supreme Court first addressed the 
topic of searches incident to arrest as dictum in Weeks v. United 
States.16 Weeks involved a warrantless seizure of papers belonging 
to the defendant in the defendant’s absence. The Court explicitly 
distinguished the issue of search incident to arrest: 
What, then, is the present case? Before answering 
that inquiry specifically, it may be well by a process 
of exclusion to state what it is not. It is not an 
assertion of the right on the part of the government, 
always recognized under English and American 
law, to search the person of the accused when 
legally arrested to discover and seize the fruits or 
evidences of crime. The right has been uniformly 
maintained in many cases . . . .17 
Today’s conception of the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine 
did not emerge until the Court’s decision in Chimel v. California.18 
In Chimel, police executed an arrest warrant for an individual at his 
house who was suspected of burglarizing a coin store. Without the 
defendant’s consent or a valid search warrant, police spent nearly 
an hour exploring the three-bedroom house, attic, and garage for 
evidence of the burglary. During the search, they uncovered coins 
and other items which were later used to convict defendant.19  
Breaking with precedent that allowed similar but more limited 
searches,20 the Court invalidated the search of the appellant’s home 
needed as evidence to prove the crime, or any property of another which he 
acquired by the crime, may be taken from him.”); Francis Wharton, TREATISE 
ON THE CRIMINAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 2975, at 39 (7th ed. 1874) 
(“Those arresting a defendant are bound to take from his person any articles 
which may be of use as proof in the trial of the offense with which the defendant 
is charged.”). See generally Logan, supra note 14, at 388-89 (2001). 
16 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
17  Id. at 392; see also Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) 
(reiterating Weeks dicta). 
18 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
19 Id. at 753-54. 
20 See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) (upholding 
warrantless search of defendant’s one-room office for forged stamps incident to 
arrest); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947) (upholding warrantless 
search of four-room apartment for stolen checks incident to arrest).  
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as unreasonably broad. While a “strictly limited right” permitted 
police to search the person and the area of “immediate control” of 
an arrestee, the majority found that the Fourth Amendment forbids 
general search of premises.21 In limiting the scope of searches 
incident to arrest, the Court identified officer safety and 
preservation of evidence as the two determinative social policy 
considerations behind the exception: 
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the 
arresting officer to search the person arrested in 
order to remove any weapons that the latter might 
seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his 
escape. Otherwise, the officer's safety might well be 
endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In 
addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting 
officer to search for and seize any evidence on the 
arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment 
or destruction.22  
The Court then extended these policy concerns to the area within 
an arrestee’s reach: 
[T]he area into which an arrestee might reach in 
order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must, of 
course, be governed by a like rule. A gun on a table 
or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be 
as dangerous to the arresting officer as one 
concealed in the clothing of the person arrested. 
There is ample justification, therefore, for a search 
of the arrestee's person and the area “within his 
immediate control”—construing that phrase to 
mean the area from within which he might gain 
possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.23 
The Court held that the trial court should have suppressed the 
resulting evidence because the police search of Chimel’s house 
21 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). 
22 Id. at 762-63. 
23 Id. at 763. 
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extended beyond the area of “immediate control.”24 
In 1973, United States v. Robinson answered a looming 
question left by Chimel: can factual circumstances limit an 
officer’s authority to conduct a search incident to an arrest?25 
Unlike Chimel, the search in Robinson bore no apparent relation to 
the underlying offense. In Robinson, police recognized a motorist 
and had reason to believe he was driving with a revoked operator’s 
permit. An officer stopped Robinson and asked to see his license. 
When he produced a fake, the officer arrested him and subjected 
him to a “full ‘field type search,’” a standard procedure within the 
officer’s department.26 That search produced a crumpled cigarette 
pack from Robinson’s coat pocket, containing fourteen heroin 
capsules. The appellate court suppressed the drugs as evidence and 
found that, where nothing justifies a search for additional evidence 
of the crime of arrest, the search must be limited to a “frisk” for 
weapons.27 The Supreme Court reversed, pronouncing an 
“unqualified authority” of police to search the person of an arrestee 
incident to lawful arrest:28  
The authority to search . . . while based upon the 
need to disarm and to discover evidence, does not 
depend on what a court may later decide was the 
probability in a particular arrest situation that 
weapons or evidence would in fact be found upon 
the person of the suspect. A custodial arrest of a 
suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable 
intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that 
intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the 
arrest requires no additional justification.29  
Under this bright-line rule, the circumstantial facts of a particular 
arrest did not influence the police’s right to search: 
24 Id. at 768. 
25 414 U.S. 218 (1973). 
26 Id. at 221-22 n.2. 
27 United States v. Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en 
banc). 
28 Robinson, 414 U.S. at 225. 
29 Id. at 235. 
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It is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes 
the authority to search, and we hold that in the case 
of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the 
person is not only an exception to the warrant 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a 
‘reasonable’ search under that Amendment.30 
With Robinson, the Court effectively severed the search-incident-
to-arrest exception from a fact-based analysis. As long as an 
officer executes a lawful arrest, he or she may conduct a “full” 
search of the arrestee and, by the implication of Chimel, the area 
within the arrestee’s “immediate control.”  
However, Robinson significantly departed from Supreme Court 
precedent on the search-incident-to-arrest exception.31 Prior cases 
required either an evidentiary link that tied the object of the search 
to the basis for the arrest or an evident threat to police safety.32 By 
allowing a search incident to arrest wherever a lawful arrest 
occurs, the Robinson Court removed such factual considerations 
from the equation. 
The most recent Supreme Court examination of the search-
incident-to-arrest doctrine came in 2009 with Arizona v. Gant,33 in 
which the Court backed away from a bright-line authorization to 
search automobiles incident to arrest. In Gant, police received an 
30 Id.  
31  Id. at 233 ( “While . . . earlier authorities are sketchy, they tend to 
support the broad statement of the authority to search incident to arrest found in 
the successive decisions of this Court, rather than the restrictive one which was 
applied by the Court of Appeals in this case.”). But see id. at 249 (“No precedent 
is cited for this broad assertion—not surprisingly, since there is none. Indeed, 
we only recently rejected such a rigid all-or-nothing model of justification and 
regulation under the Amendment, (for) it obscures the utility of limitations upon 
the scope, as well as the initiation, of police action as a means of constitutional 
regulation. This Court has held in the past that a search which is reasonable at its 
inception may violate the Fourth Amendment by virtue of its intolerable 
intensity and scope.”) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
32 See, e.g., Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 67 (1968) (“[T]he incident 
search was obviously justified ‘by the need to seize weapons and other things 
which might be used to assault an officer or effect an escape, as well as by the 
need to prevent the destruction of evidence of the crime.’”) (quoting Preston v. 
United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964)). 
33 556 U.S. 332 (2009). 
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anonymous tip reporting suspected drug activity at a house. When 
they discovered that one resident had an outstanding warrant for 
driving with a suspended license, police waited until he arrived at 
the house in his car. An officer arrested Gant and secured him in 
the patrol car’s back seat. As Gant sat handcuffed, officers 
searched his vehicle and uncovered a firearm and a bag of cocaine.  
The Supreme Court used Gant to redefine and narrow the 
parameters of acceptable searches of vehicles incident to arrest, as 
originally outlined in New York v. Belton.34 The Court rejected a 
broad reading of Belton that would allow a vehicle search-incident-
to-arrest even when the arrestee was secured and unable to access 
the vehicle’s interior.35 Instead, the Gant Court agreed with the 
Arizona Supreme Court that such an expansive right of police 
conflicts with the dual policy considerations of Chimel.36 In an 
attempt to reunite Belton with Chimel, the majority fashioned a 
new test for vehicle searches incident to arrest: 
[T]he Chimel rationale authorizes police to search a 
vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only 
when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching 
distance of the passenger compartment at the time 
of the search. 
Although it does not follow from Chimel, we 
also conclude that circumstances unique to the 
vehicle context justify a search incident to a lawful 
arrest when it is “reasonable to believe evidence 
relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the 
vehicle.”37 
Using the new test, the Court invalidated the search of Gant’s car, 
since Gant was not in reaching distance of the passenger 
compartment and the officer had no reason to believe evidence 
34 453 U.S. 454 (1981). 
35 Gant, 556 U.S. at 342-43. 
36 Id. at 343 (“To read Belton as authorizing a vehicle search incident to 
every recent occupant’s arrest would thus untether the rule from the 
justifications underlying the Chimel exception . . . .”). 
37 Id. (quoting Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004) (Scalia, 
J., concurring)). 
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relating to the crime (driving with a suspended license) would be 
found in the car.38 Importantly, Gant reintroduced factual analysis 
to one region of the search incident exception. 
 
B.  Searches of Digital Devices Incident to Arrest 
 
One justification behind the Robinson bright-line rule is that an 
officer should have the power to thoroughly investigate potential 
dangers hidden in an arrestee’s clothing or containers.39 Since the 
flood of portable electronics, searches incident to arrest have 
inevitably extended to devices such as pagers and cell phones. 
While courts uniformly recognize a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the digital content of these devices and an 
accompanying right to challenge related governmental intrusions,40 
a majority of courts currently uphold such searches.  
 
1. Lower Courts Permitting Searches of Cell Phones 
 
Robinson’s rule provides rich fodder for lower courts 
upholding searches of digital devices incident to arrest, and courts 
are keen to adhere to its framework. Many courts favor the 
“container” analogy lifted from Robinson. Since Robinson focused 
on the permissibility of a search of a physical container found on 
the arrestee’s person, many lower courts simply characterize 
pagers and cell phones as electronic containers. 
38 Id.  
39 See Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 631-32 (2004) (“[A]uthority 
to search an arrestee's person does not depend on the actual presence of one of 
Chimel's two rationales in the particular case; rather, the fact of arrest alone 
justifies the search.”) (Scalia, J., concurring); supra notes 26-31 and 
accompanying text. 
40  See United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259 (5th Cir. 2007) 
(“[Defendant] had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the call records and 
text messages on the cell phone and that he therefore has standing to challenge 
the search.”); see also City of Ontario, California v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 760 
130 S. Ct. 2619, 2630 (2010) ("Cell phone and text message communications 
are so pervasive that some persons may consider them to be essential means or 
necessary instruments for self-expression, even self-identification. That might 
strengthen the case for an expectation of privacy."). 
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One of the earliest cases to apply the container analogy to 
pagers was United States v. Chan.41 During a sting operation, DEA 
agents arrested two heroin dealers who coordinated a sale through 
one of the defendant’s pager. After the arrest, an officer seized the 
pager, accessed its memory, and recovered numbers associated 
with the drug deal. In his defense, Chan argued that the pager was 
a container, and that the agents unjustifiably searched it incident to 
arrest because of the high expectation of privacy associated with its 
contents.42 The court quickly rejected Chan’s argument. Under 
Belton, “the justification for the search is not that the arrestee has 
no privacy interest in the container, but that the lawful custodial 
arrest justifies the infringement of any privacy interest the arrestee 
may have.”43 
United States v. Finley was one of the first cases to validate the 
search of a cell phone incident to arrest.44 In Finley, police 
conducted a controlled purchase of methamphetamine. Finley 
drove the seller to the prearranged location and immediately after 
the exchange was made police arrested both individuals. During 
the arrest, officers found a cell phone in Finley’s pocket. A later 
search of the phone’s stored text messages revealed several 
references to narcotics. 
The Fifth Circuit upheld the lawfulness of the search under the 
Fourth Amendment.45 Finley argued his cell phone ought to be 
treated as a closed container, but mistakenly relied on authority 
that suppressed a search of a closed container but did not involve 
an exception to the warrant requirement.46 Like in Chan, once the 
cell phone bore the brand of a “container,” the Finley court 
invoked the categorical rule of Robinson, along with other cases 
explicitly ruling on container searches incident to arrest.47 Many 
cases have relied on the Finley decision to uphold the cell phone-
41 830 F. Supp. 531, 533 (N.D. Cal. 1993). 
42 Id. at 535. 
43 Id. (quoting New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 461 (1981)). 
44 477 F.3d 250 (5th Cir. 2007). 
45 Id. at 259. 
46 Id. at 260. 
47 Id. at 260-61 (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 223-24 
(1973); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460-461 (1981)). 
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container analogy.48 
Pagers and cell phones have also been analogized to address 
books and wallets, searches of which incident to arrest are 
traditionally permitted. In United States v. Cote, police searched 
the call logs and electronic phone book of a cell phone belonging 
to a man arrested for soliciting sex from a minor.49 The court 
upheld the search and found the analogy of a cell phone to a wallet 
or address book fitting because both “would contain similar 
information.”50 According to this perspective, items like wallets, 
photographs, and address books better approximate the function of 
cell phones.  For example, much of what they contain, such as text 
messages, contact lists, and photographs, could just as easily 
appear on a piece of paper. Just as those papers are searchable 
incident to arrest, so too are their digital counterparts.51 
 
2. Cases Restricting Searches of Cell Phones Incident to Arrest 
 
A minority of state and federal courts have suppressed 
evidence obtained from cell phones incident to arrest. The U.S. 
district court in United States v. Park found that a heightened 
privacy interest in the contents of mobile phones justified their 
protection from searches incident to arrest.52 In Park, the police 
arrested Park for marijuana cultivation and seized his cell phone. 
Police later searched the phone and copied down names and phone 
48 See, e.g., United States v. Curtis, 635 F.3d 704, 714 (5th Cir. 2011) 
(upholding search incident of text messages); United States v. Gomez, 807 F. 
Supp. 2d 1134, 1146 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (upholding the Finley decision in the 
context of a caller ID; describing Finley as “the leading case on this issue”); 
United States v. Rodriguez, No. C-11-344, 2011 US Dist. LEXIS 100433, at *11 
(S.D. Texas Sept. 6, 2011) (upholding the Finley decision in the context of 
incriminating cell phone photographs). 
49 No. 03CR271, 2005 WL 1323343 (N.D. Ill. May 26, 2005). 
50 Id. at *6. 
51 See, e.g., United States v. McCray, No. CR408-231, 2009 WL 29607, at 
*4 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 5, 2009) (“[It] is an electronic ‘container,’ in that it stores 
information that may have great evidentiary value . . . . While such electronic 
storage devices are of more recent vintage than papers, diaries, or traditional 
photographs, the basic principle still applies: incident to a person's arrest, a 
mobile phone or beeper may be briefly inspected [for evidence].”). 
52 No. CR 05-375, 2007 WL 1521573 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2007). 
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numbers stored in its memory.  
Breaking with other courts’ reliance on Robinson,53 the Park 
court turned to United States v. Chadwick54 for support.55 In 
Chadwick, the Supreme Court suppressed evidence recovered from 
a locked container. The Court reasoned that “[b]y placing personal 
effects inside a double-locked footlocker, respondents manifested 
an expectation that the contents would remain free from public 
examination.” Therefore, the footlocker deserved protection under 
the Fourth Amendment warrant clause “[n]o less than one who 
locks the doors of his home against intruders . . . .”56 Chadwick 
distinguished property searched incident to arrest based on whether 
the property was “immediately associated with the person.”57 
According to the Court, a valid search of property “not 
immediately associated with the person” requires: (1) the search 
not be remote in time or place from the arrest; and (2) some form 
of exigent circumstances compels the search.58 Furthermore, the 
Court held: 
Once law enforcement officers have reduced 
luggage or other personal property not immediately 
associated with the person of the arrestee to their 
exclusive control, and there is no longer any danger 
that the arrestee might gain access to the property to 
seize a weapon or destroy evidence, a search of that 
property is no longer incident of the arrest.59 
The Park court fundamentally distinguished its case from Finley 
by finding that cell phones should not be considered property that 
is immediately associated with an arrestee’s person, implicitly 
comparing the searched cell phone to the locked footlocker of 
Chadwick. According to Park, “[t]his is so because modern 
cellular phones have the capacity for storing immense amounts of 
53 See, e.g., United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250 (5th Cir. 2007), supra 
notes 44-52 and accompanying text.  
54 433 U.S. 1 (1977). 
55 Park, No. CR 05-375, 2007 WL 1521573, at *6.  
56 Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 11. 
57 Id. at 15. 
58 Id.  
59 Id. 
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private information.”60 Given the “increasingly blurry” line 
between cell phones and computers, the court feared that “[a]ny 
contrary holding could have far-ranging consequences.”61  
The Ohio Supreme Court case State v. Smith was the first case 
to specifically prohibit cell phone searches incident to arrest.62 In 
Smith, the court suppressed evidence from a cell phone search on 
the grounds that the expansive privacy interests in cell phone 
contents rendered the container analogy entirely inapplicable.63 
The court began by reviewing approaches to characterizing cell 
phones: “Whether the warrantless search of a cell phone passes 
constitutional muster depends upon how a cell phone is 
characterized, because whether a search is determined to be 
reasonable is always fact-driven.”64 It then examined Finley and 
Park, the two “leading” cases on the subject.65 The defendant in 
Finley conceded that “the officers' post-arrest seizure of his cell 
phone from his pocket was lawful, but he argued that, since a cell 
phone is analogous to a closed container,66 the police had no 
authority to examine the phone's contents without a warrant.” 67 
Because the defendant had not invoked a container analogy, the 
Smith court found Finley inapplicable to its decision.68 Briefly 
addressing Park, the Smith majority noted that the Park court 
found “significant privacy interests” in cell phones, due to their 
60 Park, No. CR 05-375, 2007 WL 1521573, at *8.  
61 Id. (Park also rebuked the investigatory nature of the search, stating that 
the officer’s search of Park’s cell phone went “beyond the original rationales for 
searches incident to arrest.” However, the court here appears to have overlooked 
Robinson’s explicit indifference to the actual presence of Chimel’s dual 
rationales incident to arrest.); see United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 
(1973); supra notes 24-31 and accompanying text. 
62 State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949 (Ohio 2009). 
63 Id. at 954-55. 
64 Id. at 952. But see People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501 (Cal. 2011) (finding 
inappropriate any inquiry into character of property in context of search incident 
to arrest under Robinson); United States v. Smallwood, 61 So. 3d 448 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2011), review granted, 68 So. 3d 235 (Fla. 2011) (using the same 
reasoning as Diaz). 
65 Smith, 920 N.E.2d at 953-54. 
66 United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 260 (5th Cir. 2007). 
67 Id. 
68 Smith, 920 N.E.2d at 953. 
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“capacity for storing immense amounts of private information.”69  
The court rejected the container analogy, an approach 
advocated by the state.70 Eschewing all figurative conceits, the 
court clarified that “[a container] means ‘any object capable of 
holding another object,’”71 which “must actually have a physical 
object within it.”72 Such a rigid definition left no room for 
electronic storage devices since “[e]ven the more basic models of 
modern cell phones are capable of storing a wealth of digitized 
information wholly unlike any physical object found within a 
closed container.”73 
Smith found no satisfactory classification for cell phones in use 
by courts. The “multifunctional” nature of cell phones was 
compared to traditional address books, which are entitled to a 
lower expectation of privacy compared to laptop computers in a 
search incident to arrest.74 Although cell phones are “still, in 
essence, phones” and not computers,75 the court found the “large 
amounts of private data” on cell phones sufficiently gave their 
owners a heightened expectation of privacy in that information.76 
Smith concluded: 
Once the cell phone is in police custody, the state 
has satisfied its immediate interest in collecting and 
preserving evidence and can take preventative steps 
to ensure that the data found on the phone are 
neither lost nor erased. But because a person has a 
high expectation of privacy in a cell phone’s 
contents, police must then obtain a warrant before 
intruding into the phone’s contents.77 
69 Id. (quoting United States v. Park, No. CR 05-375, 2007 WL 1521573, at 
*8 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2007)). 
70 Id. at 953-54. 
71 Id. at 954 (quoting New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981)). 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. (citing no sources in support of alleged higher expectation of privacy 
attributed to laptops). 
75 Id. at 955. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. Note that, like Park, Smith admonishes any search done in the absence 
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While not expressly stating it, the Smith majority effectively 
fashioned a new rule disqualifying cell phones from the search-
incident-to-arrest exception. The three dissenting justices attacked 
the majority for announcing “a sweeping new Fourth Amendment 
rule that is at odds with decision of other courts,” when traditional 
Fourth Amendment principles governing searches incident to arrest 
could have decided the case.78 According to the dissent, since only 
the cell phone’s call log was searched, the majority should have 
accordingly confined its inquiry.79 Because a phone’s call log 
approximates the function of a traditional address book, which 
police are permitted to search incident to arrest, the dissent argued 
evidence gleaned from the call logs should not have been 
suppressed.80 
 
3. United States v. Robinson’s Relevance to Cell Phones 
 
The Smith decision incited significant criticism from other 
courts for treading so far from Robinson’s categorical rule.81 While 
the Smith dissent strayed little from the analysis of Finley,82 a 
reaction more fundamentally attuned to Robinson arrived from the 
Florida District Court of Appeals in Smallwood v. State.83  
Affirming the admission of incriminating photographs stored 
on a cell phone, the trial court decision in Smallwood adhered 
strictly to the language of Robinson permitting a “full” search of an 
of Chimel’s justifications (officer safety and preservation of evidence), and 
thereby is inconsistent with Robinson’s express disavowal of those justifications 
when an officer searches a suspect incident to arrest. See supra note 61 and 
accompanying text. 
78 Smith, 920 N.E.2d at 956 (Cupp, J., dissenting). 
79 Id. at 956-57. 
80 Id. 
81 See, e.g., People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 511 n.17 (Cal. 2011). 
82 Compare United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 260 (5th Cir. 2007) 
(validating the search of a cell phone incident to arrest), with State v. Smith, 920 
N.E.2d 949 (Ohio 2009) (disqualifying cell phones from the search incident 
exception). 
83 61 So. 3d 448 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011), rev’d, 113 So.3d 724 (Fla. 
2013).  For a discussion of the Florida Supreme Court’s reversal, see infra notes 
177 to 185 and accompanying text. 
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arrestee’s person.84 The court took issue with restrictive 
approaches used by other courts. Smallwood first criticized the 
container analogy, observing that in Robinson, Belton, and Chimel, 
“nothing in these decisions even hints that whether a warrant is 
necessary for a search of an item properly seized from an arrestee’s 
person incident to a lawful arrest depends in any way on the 
character of the seized item.”85 
Accordingly, the Smallwood court noted, “whether or not a cell 
phone is properly characterized as a traditional ‘container’ is 
irrelevant to whether or not it is searchable upon arrest.”86 No 
language permits a court to exclude cell phones from searches 
incident to arrest under Robinson’s grant of authority to arresting 
officers to search any items on the person or within the immediate 
control of the arrestee. Smallwood also relied on Robinson to 
discredit the argument that an officer must reasonably believe a 
cell phone contains evidence of the crime of arrest in order to 
search the phone. Instead, the Robinson court found irrelevant 
“what a court may later decide was the probability in a particular 
arrest situation that weapons or evidence would in fact be found 
upon the person of the suspect.”87 Hence, “clearly the Supreme 
Court has established a bright-line rule permitting a search incident 
to arrest, regardless of whether an officer had reason to believe 
evidence would be found.”88  
Even in light of the “vast amount of personal information” 
stored on mobile phones, the Smallwood court felt “bound by 
Supreme Court precedent” to allow the search.89 The court 
observed that Robinson permitted the search of similar information 
contained in address books and wallets. However, the court 
expressed “great concern” in this new application of Robinson to 
84 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973). 
85 Smallwood, 61 So.3d at 455 (quoting Diaz, 244 P.3d 501 at 507). 
86 Id. at 460. 
87 Id. (quoting Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235).  
88 Id; see also Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 118 (1998) (noting “[i]n 
Robinson, we held that the authority to conduct a full field search as incident to 
arrest was a ‘bright-line rule,’ which was based on the concern for officer safety 
and destruction or loss of evidence, but which did not depend in every case upon 
the existence of either concern.”). 
89 Smallwood, 61 So.3d at 461. 
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cell phones, since “the Robinson court could not have 
contemplated the nearly infinite wealth of personal information 
cell phones and other similar electronic devices can hold.”90 In 
view of the many functions of modern cell phones, including their 
ability to access content on the Internet, the Smallwood court 
perceived that cell phones “can make the entirety of one’s personal 
life available for perusing by an officer every time someone is 
arrested for any offense.” The court reasoned that “this result could 
not have been . . . intended by the Robinson court.”91 The 
Smallwood court recognized the Gant court’s concerns about 
“giving officers unbridled discretion to rummage” without reason 
to believe evidence of the crime of arrest will be found.92 
Displaying great anxiety over the implications of its holding, the 
Smallwood court noted: 
Were we free to do so, we would find, given the 
advancement of technology with regards to cell 
phones and similar portable electronic devices, 
officers may only search cell phones incident to 
arrest if it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant 
to the crime of arrest might be found on the 
phone.93 
The opinion ended by posing this question of “great public 
importance”94: “Does the holding in [Robinson] allow a police 
officer to search through photographs contained within a cell 
phone which is on an arrestee’s person at the time of a valid arrest, 
notwithstanding that there is no reasonable belief that the cell 
phone contains evidence of any crime?”95 
Smallwood illustrates the predicament of current criminal 
procedure regarding searches of cell phones and other digital 
devices incident to arrest. The more that the courts appreciate the 
full range of digital information implicated by the Robinson line of 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 462. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009). 
93 Smallwood, 61 So.3d at 462. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. (emphasis in original). 
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cases, the more they appear to recoil from it. Decisively, the Smith 
court was only able to protect the individual’s privacy interests in 
cell phone contents by either misinterpreting or ignoring the full 
effect of Robinson’s holding. In contrast, the trial court in 
Smallwood confronted Robinson and showcased the tension 
produced by the technological capabilities of mobile computing 
that currently afflicts the search incident exception.  
 
II. RESOLVING COURTS’ PROBLEMATIC REASONING IN THE  
DEBATE OVER CELL PHONE SEARCHES INCIDENT TO ARREST 
 
When determining the reasonableness of a warrantless search 
under the Fourth Amendment, “there is ‘no ready test . . . other 
than by balancing the need to search . . . against the [privacy] 
invasion which the search . . . entails.’”96 In the context of searches 
incident to arrest, the Court in United States v. Robinson 
effectively ended this inquiry in favor of governmental interests.97 
Robinson’s basic holding engendered significant criticism,98 and 
the introduction of cell phones has only further complicated the 
situation.  
Some state and federal cases and a wave of scholarly 
disapproval have endeavored to curb the trend of allowing police 
an unlimited right to search cell phones incident to arrest. Four 
relevant arguments will be examined below. The first section 
makes an attempt to distinguish cell phones from traditional 
containers, and thereby exclude cell phones from the Robinson line 
96 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).  
97 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (“The authority to search the person incident to 
a lawful custodial arrest . . . does not depend on what a court may later decide 
was the probability in a particular arrest situation that weapons or evidence 
would in fact be found upon the person of the suspect . . . . It is the fact of the 
lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search, and we hold that in the 
case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an 
exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a 
‘reasonable’ search under that Amendment.”). 
98 See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 239 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (calling the 
majority’s approach “a clear and marked departure from our long tradition of 
case-by-case adjudication of the reasonableness of searches and seizures under 
the Fourth Amendment”). 
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of cases. The second section examines the misapplication of a 
concept developed in United States v. Chadwick, which prevents 
officers from searching property “not immediately associated with 
the person of the arrestee.” The third section investigates a peculiar 
jurisprudential dualism at work in Arizona v. Gant, and the 
unjustifiability of applying its “reasonable-to-search” test to cell 
phones. Finally, the last section critiques State v. Smith’s “bright-
line” reversal of Robinson’s ability to reach mobile phones. 
 
A.  The Irrelevance of Categorizing Cell Phones  
as “Closed Containers” 
 
Beginning with pagers,99 a majority of courts have validated 
warrantless searches of digital communications devices by 
invoking the traditional analogy of the closed container,100 thereby 
recalling Supreme Court cases that expressly upheld searches 
incident of closed containers.101 While the higher Court rulings 
unambiguously extended the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine to 
closed containers, nothing in those cases limited the search 
incident to searches of closed containers.102 Nevertheless, recent 
court opinions have mistakenly sought to distinguish cell phones 
from a traditional container analogy as a means of sidestepping the 
bright-line rule embodied in Robinson and its line of cases.103  
State v. Smith’s exemption of cell phones from searches 
incident relied in part on this attempt to distance cell phones from 
99 See United States v. Chan, 830 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. Cal. 1993), supra 
notes 41-43 and accompanying text. 
100 See, e.g., United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 260 (5th Cir. 2007) 
(holding the same for cell phones); United States v. Ortiz, 84 F.3d 977, 984 (7th 
Cir. 1996) (finding that a pager is analogous to a closed container); United 
States v. Chan, 830 F. Supp. 531, 534 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (holding the 
same); United States v. David, 756 F. Supp. 1385, 1390 (D. Nev. 1991) (finding 
computer memo book “indistinguishable from any other closed container”). 
101 See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 802-809 (upholding 
search of defendant’s clothing incident to arrest); Robinson, 414 U.S. at 224-37 
(upholding search of cigarette package incident to arrest). 
102 People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 510 (Cal. 2011). 
103 See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235. 
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physical containers.104 In finding the analogy improper, Smith 
turned to the definition of “container” relied on by the Supreme 
Court, stating that containers “have traditionally been physical 
objects capable of holding other physical objects. . . . ‘[C]ontainer’ 
means ‘any object capable of holding another object.’”105 Because 
cell phones do not “actually have a physical object within” them, 
Smith held they are “not . . . closed container[s] for purposes of a 
Fourth Amendment analysis.”106  
Two years after Smith, the California Supreme Court 
conclusively demonstrated the irrelevance of any container inquiry 
under current Supreme Court jurisprudence.107 In People v. Diaz, 
the court determined that “whether an item of personal property 
constitutes a ‘container’ bears no relation”108 to “the 
reasonableness of searching for . . . evidence of crime when a 
person is taken into official custody and lawfully detained.”109 
Instead, “application of [the search incident exception] turns . . . on 
whether [the item] is ‘property,’ i.e., a ‘belonging[]’ or an 
‘effect[].’”110 For example, in upholding the search of the 
arrestee’s cigarette package in Robinson, the Supreme Court 
reasoned that “[h]aving in the course of a lawful search come upon 
the crumpled package of cigarettes, [the officer] was entitled to 
inspect it; and when his inspection revealed the heroin capsules, he 
was entitled to seize them . . . .”111 As the court in Smallwood v. 
State observed of Robinson, “the search of an item found on an 
arrestee was [not] contingent upon that item being a ‘container,’ 
104 See State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 954 (Ohio 2009). 
105 Id. at 954 (Ohio 2009) (quoting New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 
(1981)). 
106 Id. at 954 (Ohio 2009); see also Diaz, 244 P.3d at 517 (“Electronic 
devices ‘contain’ information in a manner very different from [traditional 
containers, and] are not even ‘containers’ within the meaning of the [Supreme 
Court’s] search decisions.”) (citing Smith, 920 N.E.2d at 954 (Ohio 2009)) 
(Werdegar, J., dissenting). 
107 See Diaz, 244 P.3d at 510. 
108 Id.  
109 Id. (quoting United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 802-03 (1974)). 
110 Id. (quoting Edwards, 415 U.S. at 803-04, 807-08). 
111 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973). 
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nor did the opinion even use the word ‘container.’”112 Cases like 
Diaz and Smallwood illustrate the error in assuming that 
classification as a “container” has any impact on a police officer’s 
ability to search a cell phone under Robinson’s bright-line rule.  
 
B.  Misapplication of United States v. Chadwick 
 
Much of the confusion surrounding police authority to search 
particular containers incident to arrest originates from United 
States v. Chadwick. In determining the reasonableness of a police 
search of a locked footlocker, the Supreme Court developed the 
concept of items “not immediately associated with the person of 
the arrestee.”113 In respect to searches incident to arrest, the Court 
held that: 
[W]arrantless searches of luggage or other property 
seized at the time of an arrest cannot be justified as 
incident to that arrest either if the search is remote 
in time or place from the arrest, . . . or no exigency 
exists. Once law enforcement officers have reduced 
luggage or other personal property not immediately 
associated with the person of the arrestee to their 
exclusive control, and there is no longer any danger 
that the arrestee might gain access to the property to 
seize a weapon or destroy evidence, a search of that 
property is no longer an incident of the arrest.114 
Because police had taken “exclusive dominion” of the footlocker, 
and the search occurred 90 minutes after arresting the defendant, 
the Court refused to justify the search as incident to the arrest.115 
Chadwick notably distinguished116 the earlier rule of United States 
v. Edwards, which validated the search of an arrestee’s clothing ten 
hours after his arrest.117 In so distinguishing, the Chadwick court 
112 Smallwod v. State, 61 So.3d 448, 459 (Ct. App. Fla. 2011). 
113 United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977). 
114 Id. (quotation marks omitted). 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 16 n.10. 
117 United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 805-09 (1974). 
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noted “[u]nlike searches of the person . . . searches of possessions 
within an arrestee’s immediate control cannot be justified by any 
reduced expectations of privacy caused by the arrest.”118 
Some critics of searches of cell phones incident to arrest have 
misinterpreted Chadwick’s “not-immediately-associated-with-the-
person” concept as a device to except categorically cell phones 
from searches incident.119 Contrary to this view, Chadwick’s rule 
on searches incident to arrest did not establish a bright line for 
absolutely classifying property as either “immediately associated 
with the person” or not. 120 Chadwick is better read as defining the 
outer limit the “incident” of arrest.121 Applying Chadwick’s test 
therefore requires factual analysis centering primarily on the 
circumstances of the arrest, seizure, and search, rather than the 
general identity of the item.122  
While courts have interpreted Chadwick with little difficulty in 
regard to purely spatial containers, such as purses123 and 
118 Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 16 n.10. 
119 See, e.g., Byron Kish, Cellphone Searches: Works Like A Computer, 
Protected Like A Pager?, 60 CATH. U.L. REV. 445 (recommending courts 
“classify” cell phones as possessions not immediately associated with person of 
arrestee). 
120 For example, purses have generally, but not universally, been 
interpreted as items associated with the person due to their proximity to the 
arrestee. Compare People v. Mannozzi, 632 N.E.2d 627, 632 (Ct. App. Ill. 1994) 
(finding purse immediately associated with person “because it is carried on the 
person at all times”), with United States v. Monclavo-Cruz, 662 F.2d 1285 (9th 
Cir. 1981) (rejecting search of purse incident to arrest when search occurred at 
police station one hour after arrest and purse was “either in [defendant’s] hand, 
on her lap, or on the seat of the car at the time of arrest”). 
121 See Adam M. Gershowitz, Password Protected? Can A Password Save 
Your Cell Phone from A Search Incident to Arrest?, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1125, 
1156 (2011) (“Edwards and Chadwick offer two different rules for the temporal 
scope of searches incident to arrest.”). 
122 See id. at 1161 (suggesting that categorization of item as associated 
with the person or nearby possession “depends on the specific facts of the 
case”). 
123 See, e.g., People v. Thomas, 760 N.E.2d 1012 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) 
(finding search at police station valid under Edwards); People v. Mannozzi, 632 
N.E.2d 627, 632 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (“[A] purse, unlike a footlocker, has been 
held to be an item immediately associated with the person of an arrestee, 
because it is carried on the person at all times.”); People v. Harris, 164 Cal. Rptr. 
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backpacks,124 application of the rule to cell phones has produced 
controversy. United States v. Finley embodies the leading authority 
supporting the view that cell phones are possessions associated 
with the person of the arrestee.125 The Finley court reasoned that, 
because the arrestee’s cell phone “was on his person at the time of 
his arrest,” Edwards’s rule, rather than Chadwick’s, ought to 
apply.126 A majority of courts have applied Finley’s purely spatial 
formulation of Chadwick’s distinction.127  
An opposing view originated in United States v. Park, which 
concluded that mobile phones “should be considered ‘possessions 
within an arrestee’s immediate control’ and not part of ‘the 
person.’”128 Avoiding Finley’s preoccupation with physical 
proximity to the arrestee, Park rested its conclusion on the 
arrestee’s high privacy interests in the contents of the cell 
phone.129 Curiously, the Park court provided no explanation or 
support for this absolute categorization.  
Although Park’s finding is unpersuasive on its own, at least 
one other case has held that Chadwick fundamentally requires an 
analysis of privacy interests in the general class of item searched. 
296 (Ct. App. 1980) (validating a search at a station house of a purse and wallet 
contained within because under California law purses are considered regular 
extensions of the person). 
124 See People v. Boff, 766 P.2d 646, 651 n.9 (Col. 1988) (en banc) 
(finding the search of a backpack at a station was valid under Edwards because 
it “is more like a purse than a two-hundred pound double-locked footlocker”). 
125 477 F.3d 250, 258-60 (5th Cir. 2007). 
126 Id. 
127 See, e.g., People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 505-06 (2011); United States v. 
Murphy, 552 F.3d 405, 412 (4th Cir. 2009); United States v. Wurie, 612 F. 
Supp. 2d 104, 110 (D. Mass. 2009) (“I see no principled basis for distinguishing 
a warrantless search of a cell phone from the search of other types of personal 
containers found on a defendant’s person that fall within the [Edwards] 
exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirements.”); United 
States v. Curry, Criminal No. 07-100-P-H, 2008 WL 219966, at *10 (D. Me. 
Jan. 23, 2008); United States v. Diaz, No. CR 05-0167 WHA, 2006 WL 
3193770, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2006). 
128 United States v. Park, No. CR 05-375 SI, 2007 WL 1521573, at *8 
(N.D. Cal. May 23, 2007) (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 16 
n.10 (1977)). 
129 Id. at *8 (“This is so because modern cellular phones have the capacity 
for storing immense amounts of private information.”). 
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In United States v. Calandrella, the Sixth Circuit found the 
arrestee’s briefcase was not associated with the person of the 
arrestee because “the container’s ‘very purpose’ is to transport 
papers and other items of an inherently personal, private 
nature.”130 However, contrary to Calandrella, the Supreme Court 
in Chadwick made no indication that a footlocker’s typical 
contents determined whether it was associated with the person.131 
In fact, Park’s holding actually contradicts accepted divisions 
between Edwards and Chadwick. As one commentator points out, 
a person’s wallet serves as an easy counterexample to Park’s 
holding: 
[C]onsider the enormous amount of information 
police can obtain from searching a wallet—
generally held to be associated with the person of an 
arrestee—including where the arrestee banks (via 
his ATM card); where he shops (via his rewards 
cards); whether he has any medical conditions (via 
medical cards); pictures of his children; and more 
scandalous information such as motel key cards, 
condoms, or the phone number of his mistress. 
These items do not cease to be on the person of an 
arrestee simply because they convey a wealth of 
information.132 
If Supreme Court precedent exists to exempt cell phones from the 
search-incident-to-arrest exception, it does not reside in 
Chadwick’s highly fact-oriented standard. While courts may use 
Chadwick to invalidate certain searches of cell phones under the 
right circumstances, Chadwick does not provide an absolute bar to 
130 605 F.2d 236, 249 (6th Cir. 1979) (noting under Chadwick, “an 
individual has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of a container 
such as a footlocker which differs from the expectation of privacy associated 
solely with the person.”); id. (relying on Chadwick’s assertion that “searches of 
possessions within an arrestee’s immediate control cannot be justified by any 
reduced expectations of privacy caused by the arrest. [The arrestee’s] privacy 
interest in the contents of the footlocker was not eliminated simply because they 
were under arrest.”) (citing Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 16 n.10). 
131 See Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1. 
132 See supra Gershowitz, note 126 at 1160. 
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the practice. 
 
C.  The Arbitrariness of the Arizona v. Gant Standard 
 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona v. Gant133 has 
inspired some lower courts to take a different approach to limit cell 
phones searches. Gant introduced a novel, two-prong standard for 
searches of automobiles incident to arrest: “[p]olice may search a 
vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only if the arrestee is 
within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time 
of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains 
evidence of the offense of arrest.”134 Some courts have extended 
Gant-like analyses to cell phones,135 despite serious doctrinal 
criticism of Gant’s holding and a tenuous analogical thread. 
 
1. Doctrinal Ambivalence in Arizona v. Gant 
 
The Gant decision sought to remedy dissatisfaction over 
Belton’s broad allowance of searches of passenger compartments 
of cars incident to arrest.136 The replacement, which all but 
eliminated Belton’s bright-line rule,137 was adopted from a position 
advocated by Justice Antonin Scalia in his concurrence in 
133 556 U.S. 332 (2009); see supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text. 
134 Gant, 556 U.S. at 351. 
135 See, e.g., United States v. McGhee, No. 8:09CR31, slip op., 2009 WL 
2424104, at *3 (D. Neb. July 21, 2009) (invalidating cell phone search incident 
to arrest because not reasonable for officer to believe evidence of drug 
conspiracy in phone contents); United States v. Quintana, 594 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 
1299-1301 (M.D. Fla. 2009) (holding the same). 
136 See Gant, 556 U.S. at 351-52 (“The experience of the 28 years since we 
decided Belton has shown that the generalization underpinning the broad reading 
of that decision is unfounded. We now know that articles inside the passenger 
compartment are rarely within the area into which an arrestee might reach . . . 
and blind adherence to Belton's faulty assumption would authorize myriad 
unconstitutional searches.”). 
137 Id. at 343 n.4 (“Because officers have many means of ensuring the safe 
arrest of vehicle occupants, it will be the rare case in which an officer is unable 
to fully effectuate an arrest so that the real possibility of access to the arrestee’s 
vehicle remains.”). 
                                                                                                             
27
Scheurer: Are Courts Phoning It in? Resolving Problematic Reasoning in the
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2014
314 WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS  [VOL. 9:4 
Thornton v. United States.138 In Thornton, Justice Scalia based his 
“reason to believe” test on the distinction that, in contrast to 
Robinson cases (where the fact of arrest justifies the search), “in 
the context of a general evidence-gathering search, the state 
interests [expressed in Chimel] that might justify any overbreadth 
[sic] are far less compelling.”139 However, Justice Scalia’s 
justification for these “general evidence-gathering” searches 
incident to arrest remains suspect. Scalia defended these searches, 
such as the one used in United States v. Rabinowitz,140 stating: 
There is nothing irrational about broader police 
authority to search for evidence when and where the 
perpetrator of a crime is lawfully arrested. The fact 
of prior lawful arrest distinguishes the arrestee from 
society at large, and distinguishes a search for 
evidence of his crime from general rummaging. 
Moreover, it is not illogical to assume that evidence 
of a crime is most likely to be found where the 
suspect was apprehended.141 
Professor Wayne LaFave has cast serious doubt on the merits 
of these assertions, finding them “totally lacking in substance.”142 
Perhaps more significantly, the justification Justice Scalia relied on 
—that the Fourth Amendment arguably accommodates purely 
“evidence-gathering” searches incident to arrest—necessarily 
opposes the twin policy interests adopted by Chimel to limit those 
searches.143 In spite of this incompatibility, the Gant majority in 
nearly the same breath purports to adhere to Chimel while also 
supporting Justice Scalia’s rule.144 For this reason, the Gant 
dissenters criticized the majority for “rais[ing] doctrinal . . . 
138 Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004) (“I would . . . limit 
Belton searches to cases where it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to 
the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.”) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
139 Id.  
140 339 U.S. 56 (1950) (upholding search incident of one-room office 
space), overruled by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
141 Thornton, 541 U.S. at 630. 
142 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 7.1 (4th ed. 2011). 
143 Id. After all, Chimel overruled Rabinowitz. 
144 Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009).  
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problems.”145 As Justice Alito’s dissent emphasizes, the 
Rabinowitz line of cases Justice Scalia relied upon in Thornton 
were overruled by Chimel.146 While Gant accomplishes the 
intended goal of narrowing Belton, “‘better than Belton’ is hardly 
high praise,” and its “two-faced” loyalty to Chimel leaves Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence visibly fractured.147  
As with Gant’s automobile, there is simply little theoretical 
justification for applying Gant’s “reason to believe” rule to cell 
phones. Unsurprisingly, lower courts using the rule in the context 
of cell phones expose little of their reasoning. In United States v. 
Quintana, a district court suppressed evidence gained from the 
search of a cell phone of an individual incident to an arrest for 
driving with a suspended license. Although Quintana was decided 
while Gant was still pending, Quintana introduced a similar, yet 
even broader, rule that “a search incident to arrest to preserve 
evidence is permissible only to secure evidence of the crime of 
arrest, not evidence of an unrelated crime.”148 Quintana 
purportedly derived its rule from Knowles v. Iowa,149 though the 
court’s true inspiration came from Justice Scalia’s concurring 
opinion in Thornton.150  
When it came time for the court to apply its novel rule to the 
case at hand, however, the court inexplicably fell back upon an 
evaluation of Chimel’s rationales. “The search of the contents of 
Defendant’s cell phone had nothing to do with officer safety or the 
preservation of evidence related to the crime of arrest. This type of 
145  Id. at 364 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting); see also James J. Tomkovicz, 
2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1417, 1459 (2007) (“Justice Scalia's historical case for the 
evidence-gathering justification for searches incident to arrest is hardly 
compelling, [as it] provides no genuine insight into the Framers' attitudes toward 
the authority to search private spaces where arrestees are found.”). 
146 See Gant, 556 U.S. at 364 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
147 See LaFave, supra note 147. 
148 United States v. Quintana, 594 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1300 (M.D. Fla. 
2009). 
149 525 U.S. 113 (1998) (invalidating search of car incident to traffic stop 
not involving custodial arrest). 
150 Quintana, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 1300. The opinion went so far as to 
support its reasoning with corroborating comments made by Justice Scalia 
during oral arguments for Gant. 
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search is not justified by the twin rationales of Chimel and pushes 
the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine beyond its limits.”151 
Although decided before Gant, Quintana’s approach highlights the 
confusion surrounding the test Justice Scalia envisioned in 
Thornton. Instead of arriving at an application of this test through 
cogent analysis, supporters abuse the “reason to believe” standard 
as a shortcut to their goal of avoiding the reach of Robinson and 
limiting searches of cell phones incident to arrest.152  
 
2. The Problem of Analogizing Gant 
 
Even if we tolerate Gant’s underlying ambivalence toward 
Chimel, the more practical problem remains of properly 
analogizing vehicles and cell phones. Gant involved, of course, the 
search of a vehicle incident to the occupant’s arrest. Central to its 
justification for espousing Justice Scalia’s Thornton rule was the 
majority’s consideration of the “circumstances unique to the 
vehicle context.”153 Apart from the Court’s use of the word 
“unique”—suggesting Gant’s rule is limited to automobiles—the 
opinion yields almost no explanation of what those circumstances 
are, and how those facts necessitate Gant’s holding. One clue 
might arise from the Court’s disapproval of Belton’s 
undervaluation of individuals’ privacy interests in cars.154 The 
151 Id. 
152 See, e.g., H. Morley Swingle, Smartphone Searches Incident to Arrest, 
68 J. MO. B. 36, 38 (2012) (“The Gant ‘evidence-related-to-crime-of-arrest’ 
analysis provides a workable framework to apply to searches of smartphones 
incident to arrest.”); Jana L. Knott, Is There An App for That? Reexamining The 
Doctrine of Search Incident to Lawful Arrest in The Context of Cell Phones, 35 
OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 445, 477 (“A rule allowing officers to search a cell phone 
incident to lawful arrest if they have reason to believe evidence of the offense of 
arrest will be found in the phone prevents courts from having to fashion a 
completely new rule based on the technology of cell phones. With such a rule, 
the focus is less on the type of phone, the features of a particular phone, or 
whether the phone is a smart phone or a basic cell phone, but rather the focus for 
courts is whether the officer had reason to believe that evidence of crime would 
be stored in the phone.”). 
153 Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 364 (2009) (quoting Thornton v. United 
States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring)). 
154 Id. at 344-45 (“[T]he State seriously undervalues the privacy interests 
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Gant Court expressed concern over a “serious and recurring threat 
to privacy”—namely an “unbridled discretion to rummage”—
arising “whenever an individual is caught committing a traffic 
offense.”155 However, if a concern for privacy was the 
determinative issue, it is not clear why the Court did not simply 
fall back on a probable cause standard through the automobile 
exception.156 Gant’s vague reasoning provides no workable basis 
upon which to rest an analogy between a cell phone and an 
automobile.  
 
D.  State v. Smith, Smallwood v. State, and the 
Insufficiency of a High Expectation of Privacy to  
Preclude a Search Incident to Arrest 
 
1. State v. Smith 
 
Modern cell phones’ ability to grant access to enormous 
amounts of personal information and media begs the question of 
privacy interests under the Fourth Amendment. In the words of the 
American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio: 
Even the simplest of today’s cell phones do more 
than just make and receive telephone calls. 
Typically, they have the capability of sending, 
receiving, and storing text messages. They have 
built in cameras and can take pictures, send them 
wirelessly to others, and store them. They record 
not only phone numbers that people intentionally 
at stake. Although we have recognized that a motorist’s privacy interest in his 
vehicle is less substantial than in his home . . . the former interest is nonetheless 
important and deserving of constitutional protection.”). 
155 Id. at 345. 
156 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54 (1925) (“It would be 
intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition agent were authorized to stop every 
automobile on the chance of finding liquor, and thus subject all persons lawfully 
using the highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such a search . . . .  
[T]hose lawfully within the country, entitled to use the public highways, have a 
right to free passage without interruption or search unless there is known to a 
competent official, authorized to search, probable cause for believing that their 
vehicles are carrying contraband or illegal merchandise.”). 
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left for them, as do pagers, but lists of both numbers 
called and numbers from which calls were received, 
commonly with details of both date/time and call 
duration. More sophisticated phones contain 
complete address books, appointment calendars, 
and e-mail. And they can surf the internet. People 
store everything from recipes and shopping lists to 
pictures of their children and their social security 
and bank account numbers on their cell phones. 
When the phones are used by employees, they often 
contain highly confidential business information. 
Rather than pagers, today's cellular phones are 
properly analogized to a combination telephone, 
office safe, and laptop computer.157 
Digital communication and data use through cell phones are 
growing in our society. In 2011, 331.6 million “wireless subscriber 
connections” were active in the United States.158 That number 
equated to 104.6 percent penetration in 2011, compared to 76.6 
percent in 2006, and 44.2 percent in 2001.159 Another 2011 figure 
estimated 40 percent of U.S. mobile phone users owning 
multimedia-centered smartphones.160 Courts have consistently 
recognized a reasonable expectation of privacy in cell phone 
contents.161 Increasingly, courts have given greater recognition to 
cell phones’ immense storage capabilities.162  
157 Merit Brief for American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio Foundation, 
Inc. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant, Antwaun Smith at 6, State v. Smith, 
920 N.E.2d 949, 955 (Ohio 2009).  
158 Wireless Quick Facts, CTIA: THE WIRELESS ASSOCIATION, 
http://www.ctia.org/your-wireless-life/how-wireless-works/wireless-quick-facts. 
159 Id. 
160 Don Kellogg, 40 Percent of U.S. Mobile Users Own Smartphones; 40 
Percent are Android, NIELSONWIRE (Sept. 1, 2011), http://blog.nielsen.com/ 
nielsenwire/online_mobile/40-percent-of-u-s-mobile-users-own-smartphones-
40-percent-are-android/.  
161 See United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259 (5th Cir. 2007). 
162 See, e.g., United States v. Zavala, 541 F.3d 562, 577 (5th Cir. 2008); 
United States v. Quintana, 594 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1299 (M.D. Fla. 2009); United 
States v. Park, No. CR 05-375 SI, 2007 WL 2424104, at *8 (N.D. Cal. May 23 
2007); State v. Smith 920 N.E.2d 949, 955 (Ohio 2009); Smallwood v. State, 61 
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As described above, the Ohio Supreme Court made history in 
2009 as the first high court to prohibit categorically searches of 
cell phones incident to arrest.163 The court held in State v. Smith 
that modern cell phones’ immense storage capabilities created an 
expectation of privacy high enough to entirely exclude all cell 
phones from searches incident to arrest.164 The Smith court found 
that, because nothing about the search of the phone implicated 
either officer safety or preservation of evidence, and because of the 
high privacy interest in the phone’s contents, “an officer may not 
conduct a search of a cell phone’s contents incident to a lawful 
arrest without first obtaining a warrant.”165 Apart from an initial 
citation to United States v. Katz,166 the Smith court arrived at its 
conclusion without referencing a single case.  
Smith’s silence on prior authority is unsurprising, since none 
actually supports the court’s conclusion. In fact, as the Supreme 
Court of California identified two years later in People v. Diaz,167 
controlling precedent actually opposes the reasoning used by 
Smith. Although it did not directly address the Smith opinion, Diaz 
confronted many of the arguments used by the Ohio court. Diaz 
primarily questioned why “the sheer quantity of personal 
information [stored on cell phones] should be determinative,” 
when smaller containers may still “contain highly personal, 
intimate and private information.”168 Diaz noted that the U.S. 
Supreme Court has approved of lower court decisions allowing 
officers to search the contents of papers incident to arrest.169 
So.3d 448, 461 (Ct. App. Fla. 2011). 
163 State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949 (Ohio 2009). 
164 Id. at 955 (“[Cell phones’] ability to store large amounts of private data 
gives their uses a reasonable and justifiable expectation of a higher level of 
privacy in the information they contain.”). 
165 Id. (distinguishing the functionality of cell phones from computers). 
But see id. (declining to distinguish between so-called “standard” cell phones 
and those with more functions and storage). 
166 Id. 
167 244 P.3d 501 (2011). 
168 Id. at 507-08. 
169 See id. (citing United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 803, n.4 
(1974)); see, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez-Perez, 426 F.2d 1283, 1285–87 (5th 
Cir. 1970) (upholding search incident of papers contained in pockets, wallets, 
and purse); United States v. Frankenberry, 387 F.2d 337, 339 (2d Cir. 1967) 
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Boiling down precedent from Belton and Robinson, Diaz argued: 
[T]he salient point of the high [C]ourt’s decisions is 
that a lawful custodial arrest justifies the 
infringement of any privacy interest the arrestee 
may have in property immediately associated with 
his or her person at the time of arrest . . . even if 
there is no reason to believe the property contains 
weapons or evidence.170 
How Smith’s holding—based on a heightened expectation of 
privacy in cell phones—can survive within the jurisprudential 
environment Diaz describes is perplexing. Tellingly, Smith avoids 
any discussion of Robinson within the section pertinent to its 
holding.171 Robinson would seem to foreclose any inquiry into 
expectations of privacy or into the type of property searched, as 
well as Smith’s analysis of Chimel’s twin justifications for a 
search.172 In short, Smith’s rule fundamentally conflicts with 
longstanding Supreme Court precedent defining the valid scope of 
searches incident to arrest. 
Smith’s failure to delimit the proper subject of its ruling also 
raises significant questions as to real-world law enforcement. 
While Smith addressed a particular search incident of a “standard” 
cell phone, it chose to bundle all mobile phones under its term 
“cell phone,” while neglecting to define any fundamental 
characteristics a “cell phone” must possess. At most, the court 
distinguished “cell phones” from address books and laptop 
computers.173 In response to this broad umbrella, Diaz asked the 
(diary); Cotton v. United States, 371 F.2d 385, 392 (9th Cir. 1967) (papers 
contained in pockets); Grillo v. United States, 336 F.2d 211, 213 (1st Cir. 1964) 
(paper contained in wallet). 
170 People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 508 (Cal. 2011) (citing United States v. 
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (quotation marks omitted)). 
171 See State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 954-55 (Ohio 2009).  
172 See id. at 955 (“A search of the cell phone’s contents was not necessary 
to ensure officer safety, and the state failed to present any evidence that the call 
records and phone numbers were subject to imminent destruction.”). 
173 See id. (“[C]ell phones are neither address books nor laptop computers. 
They are more intricate and multifunctional than traditional address books, yet 
they are still, in essence, phones, and thus they are distinguishable from laptop 
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practical questions: “How would an officer in the field determine 
whether the item’s storage capacity is constitutionally significant? 
And how would an officer in the field determine this question upon 
arresting a suspect?”174 Of course, an argument exists that, based 
on the integration of increasing local storage capacities and 
“cloud” storage into modern cell phones,175 Diaz’s questions 
quickly will become irrelevant.  
However, Smith still failed to answer the more fundamental 
questions of “why cell phones, and why now?” Smith provided no 
practicable guidance regarding the point at which other forms of 
property might contain enough personal information to allow for a 
heightened expectation of privacy to require a similar exemption 
from searches incident. The most we know from Smith is that, 
somewhere between an address book and a laptop computer, 
property becomes imbued with a heightened expectation of 
privacy. Instead of confronting the perceived flaws of current 
Fourth Amendment search incident doctrine and attempting to 
better define the scope of the search incident exception in the 
digital age, Smith merely carved out an unsound shelter for a vague 
category of technology using reasoning that, as Diaz made clear, 
conflicts with established Supreme Court precedent.  
 
2. Smallwood v. State 
 
In 2013, the Florida Supreme Court answered the appellate 
computers.”). 
174 Diaz, 244 P.3d at 508; see also United States v. Murphy, 552 F.3d 405, 
411 (4th Cir. 2009) (refusing to distinguish cell phones based on “large” storage 
capacity because of difficulty of quantifying that term “in any meaningful 
way”). 
175 At the time of writing, the largest capacity available in Apple’s “iPhone 
4S” is 64 gigabytes. See Select an iPhone 4S, APPLE (2012), 
http://store.apple.com/us/browse/home/shop_iphone/family/iphone/iphone4s. 
The first iPhone, introduced in 2007, held a capacity of only 4 gigabytes. The 
iPhone software “iCloud” allows users to store music files, photographs, 
documents, applications, calendars, and contact information in Apple’s servers 
for remote access from their iPhones. See iCloud, APPLE (2012), 
http://www.apple.com/iphone/icloud/.  
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court’s “question of great public importance”176 with a reversal,177 
using language closely echoing State v. Smith. The court began its 
inquiry by entirely rejecting the relevance of Robinson to the facts 
of Smallwood v. State. The court distinguished Robinson on the 
grounds that Robinson was “neither factually nor legally on point” 
with the issue presented in Smallwood.178 The court based its 
distinction on a comparison of the property searched in each case, 
ultimately finding that Robinson’s crumpled cigarette pack and 
Smallwood’s mobile phone factually dissimilar enough to prevent 
Robinson’s holding from applying. To this effect, the court stated 
“[i]n our view, attempting to correlate a crumpled package of 
cigarettes to the cell phones of today is like comparing a one-cell 
organism to a human being. The two objects are patently 
incomparable because of the obvious and expansive differences 
between them.”179 In particular, the cell phone’s ability to grant 
access to “extensive information and data” sufficiently departed 
from Robinson’s set of facts to prevent Robinson’s holding from 
controlling.180  
The Court’s line of inquiry suggests that, when evaluating the 
propriety of a search of personal items incident to arrest, courts 
ought to inquire into the nature and characteristics of the property. 
However, Robinson makes no suggestion that the validity of the 
search depended in any way upon the character of the property 
searched. To the contrary, Robinson suggests characteristics of 
property are an improper factor for courts to consider: 
The authority to search the person incident to lawful 
custodial arrest, while based upon the need to 
disarm and to discover evidence, does not depend 
on what a court may later decide was the probability 
in a particular arrest situation that weapons or 
evidence would in fact be found upon the person of 
176 Smallwood v. State, 61 So.3d 448 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011); see supra 
notes 95–96 and accompanying text. 
177 Smallwood v. State, 113 So.3d 724 (Fla. 2013). 
178 Id. at 730. 
179 Id. at 732. 
180 Id. at 731. 
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the suspect.181  
Robinson’s bright-line rule supported policy considerations that 
police officers’ subjective beliefs about the evidentiary weight of 
certain items or the dangerousness of certain arrestees should be 
removed from search incident to arrest procedure.182  In contrast to 
the Florida Supreme Court’s fixation on the particular 
characteristics of the searched item, the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Robinson explicitly refused to evaluate the particular facts of the 
arrestee or the items uncovered in the course of the resulting 
search. Federal precedent therefore requires that the rule developed 
in Robinson and its line of cases should apply regardless of the 
type of property at issue.  
 
3. Smallwood and Smith: Common Problems 
 
The Smallwood and Smith holdings rely on a common tactic of 
ignoring the full effect of Robinson or, in the Smallwood situation, 
entirely rejecting its relevance, in order to apply a heightened 
expectation of privacy to cell phones. As demonstrated by Diaz 
and the Florida Court of Appeals, the assumption that Robinson 
has no factual application to searches of cell phones is misguided. 
If we accept that a cell phone constitutes property, and that it was 
located on the suspect’s person at the time of arrest, then nothing 
prevents Robinson from applying to its search incident to an arrest.  
In addition to misinterpreting the reach of Robinson’s rule, the 
Smallwood and Smith courts fail to define the scope of their own 
holdings. The Smallwood court concluded that “electronic devices 
that operate as cell phones of today” cannot be treated according to 
Robinson’s rule.183 The court supplies only nebulous 
interpretations of the term “cell phone” and what technology 
suffices to protect an electronic device from searches incident to 
arrest. The court’s conclusion hinged on distinguishing the “vast 
nature of the information” available through a modern cell phone 
181 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235-36 (1973).  
182 See id. at 236 (“[I]t is of no moment that [the officer] did not indicate 
any subjective fear of [the arrestee] or that he did not himself suspect that [the 
arrestee] was armed.”). 
183 Smallwood, 113 So. 3d at 732. 
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from the “limited-capacity” and “non-interactive” cigarette packet 
in Robinson.184 Of course, a stark distinction is easy when the only 
points of comparison are a modern mobile device and a small 
cardboard box. But deciding what kind of rule to apply becomes 
more difficult when comparing different mobile devices which do 
not lend themselves to easy categorization. Increasingly, 
electronics are being produced to fit any functional niche for which 
a market exists: laptops, tablet computers, smartphones, feature-
phones, wearable devices with Bluetooth connections, digital 
cameras with wireless Internet capabilities, e-readers, and so on. 
The technologies of these gadgets can both overlap and vary 
greatly.  
Even if the Smallwood and Smith decisions tend to sympathize 
with the general public’s expectation of privacy in mobile devices, 
they ignore decades of case law on an established exception to the 
warrant requirement to search property. Other states should take 
these cases as examples of improper solutions to this complex 
issue. The following section explores two possible avenues that do 
not undermine the judiciary’s credibility. 
 
III. RECONNECTING WITH CHIMEL: TWO APPROACHES FORWARD 
 
Despite the persistent mess of Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence,185 some “fundamental principles”186 remain 
relatively unquestioned in the context of searches incident to 
arrest.187 One of those principles maintains that “in order for a 
search incident to arrest to be reasonable as opposed to merely 
exploratory, it must be grounded in at least one of the rationales for 
which the exception was created: officer safety or the preservation 
of evidence.”188 If we accept these two justifications as the basis of 
184 Id. 
185 See LaFave, supra note 1 (“The [Fourth] Amendment . . . continues to 
spawn a seemingly endless stream of litigation; as some issues are finally put to 
rest, still others surface and cry out for litigation.”). 
186 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (referring to principles 
established in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969)). 
187 But see Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 631-32 (2004) 
(Scalia, J., concurring). 
188 United States v. McLaughlin, 170 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting 
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governmental interest in searches incident to arrest, whatever 
approach is taken toward cell phones and other digital devices 
must incorporate them. Two possible methods of resolution are 
discussed here: one judicially based solution, and another 
legislatively based avenue. 
 
A.  Judicial Solution: Limit Robinson’s Scope 
 
Although it would depart from the present categorical search 
incident rule developed in Robinson,189 this Article recommends 
that courts adopt a rule similar to one proposed by Professor 
Stephen Saltzburg:.190 His rule is that during a search of the person 
of the arrestee incident to lawful arrest, (1) once an officer 
determines that a piece of property seized from the arrestee 
contains nothing posing a risk to officer safety, (2) the officer may 
continue searching that item only if (a) the possibility reasonably 
exists that the item contains evidence related to the crime of arrest, 
and (b) the arrestee remains capable of accessing the item.191 If 
either of the last two criteria are unfulfilled during the search, the 
officer must refrain from further intrusion and seek a warrant for 
the particular item.192 
This rule offers courts numerous advantages. First, it centers 
the focus of a search incident analysis to the foundational, 
exigency-based tenets of Chimel v. California.193 It is well 
established that a warrantless search must be “strictly 
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969)) (Trott, J., concurring). 
189 See supra notes 24-31 and accompanying text. 
190 See Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Fourth Amendment: Internal Revenue 
Code or Body of Principles?, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 956, 980 (2006) (“(1) an 
officer always may search the arrested person for weapons and search any 
container from which the suspect could get a weapon; (2) once an officer has 
determined that a suspect has no weapon or has disarmed the suspect, the officer 
may only continue to search a container for evidence as long as there is some 
possibility that it contains evidence and the suspect remains capable of opening 
the container and destroying the contents; and (3) thereafter, the officer may 
only seize a container to bring before a magistrate in order to seek a warrant to 
search it further.”). 
191 Id. 
192 Id. 
193 395 U.S. 752 (1969); see supra notes 17–23 and accompanying text. 
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circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation.”194 
Cell phones naturally carry no threat to officer safety. When a cell 
phone is seized from the arrestee and the arrestee has no ability to 
regain control of the device, the officer has fulfilled Chimel’s 
second exigency justification of preserving evidence. Some courts 
have pointed to the potential of incoming calls or messages to 
overwrite stored data, or for an accomplice to remotely wipe a 
phone’s content.195 While these observations may hold merit, such 
questions require highly technical examinations of different 
devices’ technologies and countermeasures. Such inquiries extend 
beyond the scope of this Article.  
The above rule would intentionally limit an officer’s ability to 
peruse the written content papers or visual content of photographs 
found on the person of the arrestee. The exigency argument for 
searching the contents of physical papers is even weaker than for 
electronic media because there is no threat of data loss. Absent 
peculiar circumstances threatening to destroy the papers, a search 
of such documents would require a warrant. 
Second, the proposed rule returns the scope of searches 
incident to offense-specific evidence preservation—an approach 
that better reflects early search incident procedure.196 While the 
exact point at which this historical limitation of searches incident 
to arrest dropped out of Supreme Court jurisprudence is unclear, 
Robinson unambiguously heralded the Court’s interpretation of an 
“unqualified” ability of police to search. Parting ways with 
Robinson’s unqualified “general authority” in favor of the earlier 
“crime of arrest” approach would more closely approximate the 
Framers’ understanding of a reasonable search incident to arrest. 
As Professor LaFave writes, “it is unfortunate that Justice 
Rehnquist [in Robinson] did not give closer attention to the 
question of whether such a broad search-incident-to-arrest rule is 
warranted [by prior Supreme Court decisions].”197 Again, this 
194 Terry v. Ohio, 392 US 1, 26 (1968). 
195 See, e.g., United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803, 807–9 (7th Cir. 
2012) (discussing possibility of “remote-wiping” of phone and rejecting 
practicality of preventative measures by officers). 
196 See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text. 
197 LaFave, supra note 147, at § 5.2. 
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subject calls for greater examination elsewhere. 
Third, this rule ultimately acknowledges the public’s high 
expectation of privacy in their mobile devices198 while avoiding 
the line-drawing problems that plagued State v. Smith.199 The topic 
of cell phone searches incident to arrest has received significant 
and generally negative attention from public interest 
organizations200 and the technology community,201 indicating a 
widespread and high public expectation of privacy in information 
accessible through digital devices. Finally, this rule by design is 
not limited to “cell phones,” which are a technology in flux and 
already can be seen functionally overlapping with other portable 
computers, such as laptops and tablets.  
 
B.  Legislative Solution: Bypass Judicial Indecision 
 
Given the improbability of a court narrowing Robinson’s 
bright-line rule, state legislatures provide a better avenue for 
greater protection of digital devices. The California Legislature’s 
attempt to limit searches of cell phones202 drew the attention of 
news media.203 The bill produced even greater response after 
California governor Jerry Brown vetoed it amid speculation of 
political motivations to support law enforcement interests.204 In a 
198 See supra notes 162-66 and accompanying text. 
199 See supra notes 177-79 and accompanying text. 
200 See, e.g., Elizabeth Wong, Can You Hear Me Now? Get A Warrant!, 
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF VIRGINIA (June 3, 2011, 11:54 
AM), http:// va.org/7617/can-you-hear-me-now-get-a-warrant; Searches 
Incident to Arrest, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, 
https://www.eff.org/issues/search-incident-arrest (last visited April 19, 2012). 
201 See, e.g., Ryan Radia, Why you should always encrypt your 
smartphone, ARS TECHNICA (“published about a year ago”), 
http://arstechnica.com/gadgets/guides/2011/01/why-you-should-always-encrypt-
your-smartphone.ars. 
202 S.B. 914, 2011-12 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011), http://info.sen.ca.gov/ 
pub/11-12/bill/sen/sb_0901-0950/sb_914_bill_20110902_enrolled.pdf. 
203 See, e.g., Ryan Singel, Gov. Brown: Sign Bill Outlawing Warrantless 
Smartphone Searches, WIRED: THREAT LEVEL (Sept. 22 2011 8:26 pm), 
available at http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/09/smartphone-warrant/. 
204 See David Kravets, Calif. Governor Veto Allows Warrantless 
Cellphone Searches, WIRED: THREAT LEVEL (Oct. 10, 2011 11:09 am), 
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terse written message the public, Governor Brown explained his 
veto that “[t]his measure would overturn a California Supreme 
Court decision that held that police officers can lawfully search the 
cell phones of people who they arrest. The courts are better suited 
to resolve the complex and case-specific issues relating to 
constitutional search-and-seizure protections.”205 The case Brown 
referred to was People v. Diaz.206 
In response, Professor Orin Kerr addressed what he saw as 
Brown’s misplaced reliance on the courts in this context: 
I think Governor Brown has it exactly backwards. It 
is very difficult for courts to decide Fourth 
Amendment cases involving developing 
technologies like cell phones. Changing technology 
is a moving target, and courts move slowly: They 
are at a major institutional disadvantage in striking 
the balance properly when technology is in flux . . . 
. In contrast, legislatures have a major institutional 
advantage over courts in this setting. They can 
better assess facts, more easily amend the law to 
reflect the latest technology, are not stuck following 
precedents, can adopt more creative regulatory 
solutions, and can act without a case or controversy. 
For these reasons, legislatures are much better 
equipped than courts to strike the balance between 
security and privacy when technology is in flux.207 
available at http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/10/warrantless-phone-
searches/ (“[A] police union that opposed the legislation . . . recently donated 
$38,900 to Brown’s campaign coffers.”). 
205 Edmund G. Brown Jr., SB 914 Veto Message, OFFICE OF THE 
GOVERNOR (Oct. 9, 2011), http://gov.ca.gov/docs/SB_914_Veto_Message.pdf. 
206 See 244 P.3d 501 (Cal. 2011); supra notes 171-74 and accompanying 
text. 
207 Orin S. Kerr, Governor Brown Vetoes Bill on Searching Cell Phones 
Incident to Arrest, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 10, 2011 2:29 am), 
http://volokh.com/2011/10/10/governor-brown-vetoes-bill-on-searching-cell-
phones-incident-to-arrest/; see also Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and 
New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and The Case for Caution, 102 MICH. 
L. REV. 801, 867-82 (2004) (reviewing “three basic differences critical to a 
comparison of the institutional competence of courts and legislatures” in the 
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Unbound by stare decisis and capable of easily revising their rules 
to adapt to changes in the technological world, legislatures likely 
provide a better channel than the courts to effect this kind of 
reform.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
As cell phones and future iterations of mobile computing 
become more portable, more powerful, and more convenient, the 
public will increasingly rely on them to organize and access 
personal information. While devices like cell phones might store a 
great amount of personal information, our right to the privacy of 
that information during custodial arrests is not supported by 
Supreme Court case law. Numerous arguments have been made to 
limit police access to the contents of cell phones during searches 
incident to arrest.208 Although not all have been addressed by this 
Article, I have attempted to show that many of these arguments are 
either in direct opposition to Supreme Court precedent, or lack a 
persuasive rationale for adopting them. In response, this Article 
recommends two possible approaches for limiting police authority 
to search cell phones incident to arrest. The first is judicially 
based.209 While the rule itself challenges the application of United 
States v. Robinson210 to digital devices, I have attempted to rest it 
on established and desirable policy goals.211 Alternatively, state 
legislatures enacting statutory protections offer faster, more 
adaptable, and better informed means of regulating these 
searches.212 Whatever method is used should reestablish contact 
with the search-incident-to-an-arrest exception’s foundational 
policy goals as expressed in Chimel v. California.213 
 
 
context of generating rules of criminal procedure). 
208 See supra Part III. 
209 See supra Part IV(A). 
210 414 U.S. 218 (1973); see supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text. 
211 See supra Part IV(A). 
212 See supra Part IV(B). 
213 395 U.S. 752 (1969); see supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text. 
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